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Abstract
Threats against computer networks continue to multiply, but existing security so-
lutions are persistently unable to keep pace with these challenges. In this paper we
present a new paradigm for securing computational resources which we call decoy tech-
nology. This technique involves seeding a system with data that appears authentic but
is in fact spurious. Attacks can be detected by monitoring this phony information for
access events. Decoys are capable of detecting malicious activity, such as insider and
masquerade attacks, that are beyond the scope of traditional security measures. They
can be used to address confidentiality breaches either proactively or after they have
taken place.
This work examines the challenges that must be overcome in order to successfully
deploy decoys as part of a comprehensive security solution. It discusses situations
where decoys are particularly useful as well as characteristics that effective decoy ma-
terial should share. Furthermore, we describe the tools that we have developed to
efficiently craft and distribute decoys in order to form a network of sensors that is ca-




Organizations across the globe are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of securing
their computer systems. As a consequence, worldwide sales of security software rose by 7.5%
in 2011 [5]. Government agencies are particularly conscious of the need to defend their
computing infrastructure. This is exemplified by the fact that the United States government
increased funding for cybersecurity research by 35% from 2011 to 2012 [15]. Attentiveness
to security practices has also risen at the individual level, as 90% of American adults now
believe that a safe Internet is critical to the U.S. economy [16].
Yet in spite of the heightened scrutiny that security practices have been under, computer
crimes continue to flourish. A recent study by the Ponemon Institute found that the number
of cyberattacks has more than doubled since 2010 [14]. Since these attacks are also becoming
more complex and difficult to anticipate, an average company can currently expect to be the
victim of 1.8 successful offensive efforts per month [14].
The vast majority of existing computer security measures focus on controlling access to
keep malicious actors out. Other approaches attempt to eliminate system vulnerabilities or
at least prevent their exploitation. The aforementioned trends in security statistics leave
little doubt that these techniques are not capable of sufficiently securing today’s computer
networks. Over time such security solutions will invariably fail, allowing adversaries to
illicitly access system credentials, data, and financial resources. Furthermore, traditional
security techniques offer no defense against “insiders” who initially hold legitimate credentials
but later choose to go rogue.
This paper proposes the use of decoys as a new paradigm for addressing computer security
issues that existing defenses are not capable of detecting. Decoys are constructs which contain
data that appears valuable but is in fact spurious. Since authentic users will have a natural
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familiarity with their working environment, they are capable of remembering which resources
are real and which are fabricated. They will have no need, therefore, to access inauthentic
decoys that contain no truly useful data.
Adversaries without a thorough knowledge of a target system, on the other hand, will
have difficulty differentiating decoys from desirable data. After the number of decoy access
events pass a certain threshold, an organization can respond by enacting more restrictive
security measures and launching an investigation into the account which caused the alerts
to occur. Monitoring access to decoy files and content can thus provide protection against
cyberattacks in a practical and cost effective fashion.
Decoy technology also addresses the asymmetry that currently exists with respect to re-
sponding to different types of security violations after they have already occurred. In the
case of data integrity breaches, recovery mechanisms have been developed that allow ad-
ministrators to “roll back” systems to a checkpointed state that existed prior to when the
malicious event took place. Similarly, attacks against the availability of computer networks
can be thwarted by increasing the amount of redundant resources that are deployed. Previ-
ously, there was no such solution for reacting to attacks against system confidentiality after
the fact, however. Decoys can serve this role by providing a mechanism through which data
can be tracked after an adversary has already absconded with it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous research related
to decoy technology. Next, Section 3 discusses desirable decoy properties in detail. Several
scenarios in which decoys can be deployed as a beneficial security measure are proposed in
Section 4. Section 5 contains information on how decoy material can be created in an auto-
mated fashion, while Section 6 talks about how decoys can be efficiently placed throughout
an organization. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.
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2 Related Work
The use of deceptive techniques, such as disinformative propaganda, to thwart one’s enemies
has played a part in military conflict since antiquity. No one has summarized the importance
of disinformation in the context of combat more concisely than Sun Tzu, who wrote that “all
warfare is based on deception” in the Art of War [17]. A well known example of deception
in a military context is Operation Bodyguard, which was an Allied plan used during World
War II to distract German forces from the invasion of Normandy [8]. Although deception
is an ancient concept, it has only recently been applied to the process of securing computer
systems. Cliff Stoll was the first person known to utilize misdirection in order to secure
a network of computers. Stoll established a spurious set of computing resources in order
to catch hackers who were attempting to exfiltrate information from Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory [6].
Computers whose primary function is to attract the attention of malicious actors are often
called “honeypots.” Entire networks of such spurious machines are known as “honeynets.”
These systems are usually constructed in a way such that they appear as though they are
an unassuming component of a larger network architecture. In reality, however, they fail
to contain any useful data and are cordoned off from network resources which are actually
valued.
Honeypots and honeynets can be quite effective when used to detect external threats.
Their applicability towards defending against attacks originating from within an organization
is limited, though. This is due to the fact that this class of adversaries typically already
have the knowledge that is required to access the portion of a network where legitimate
data resides. Furthermore, honeypots offer no utility after a successful attack has already
occurred.
Spitzner extended the concept of honeypots to the domain of insider threat detection by
inventing the concept of “honeytokens” [12]. Honeytokens are deceptive security constructs
that work at a much finer granularity than honeypots or honeynetworks. They are individual
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pieces of information that are intended to attract adversarial attention but lack meaningful
data. Illegitimate access credentials or forged personally identifiable information can be
considered examples of honeytokens. Yuill et al. coined the term “honeyfiles” to describe a
document that contains such enticing information [10].
Since the inception of honeyfiles, research has focused on how they can be effectively
designed and efficiently deployed. In [1], Bowen et al. developed the Decoy Document
Distributor (D3) System, a tool for automatically generating and monitoring decoys. D3 is
summarized in Section 5. The authors of [1] also established a set of properties that can be
used to assess the effectiveness of decoys. A detailed description of these properties can be
found in Section 3.
Next, Ben Salem and Stolfo conducted a user study to test the efficacy of decoys that were
deployed with these characteristics in mind [13]. This experiment confirmed the ability of
decoys to detect attacks by masqueraders. It also identified several trade offs between decoy
attributes that can be optimized to defend against specific types of attackers. Furthermore,
these authors suggested techniques that can be used to increase the attractiveness of decoys
to insiders without interfering with the expected workflow of legitimate users [13].
Most recently, the authors of [9] discussed how language manipulation can be used to
craft decoy content that adversaries may find more appealing but normal users would be
capable of immediately recognizing as fake. Researchers have also begun investigating how
the decoy concept can be applied to other domains. For example, in [19], Park and Stolfo
develop a system for protecting software repositories by using decoy Java programs to confuse
potential thieves.
3 Properties of Decoys
It is easy to see that some decoy material is more applicable to certain scenarios than others.
For example, if an adversary is motivated by financial gain, a decoy document containing
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bank credentials is more likely to capture their malicious activity than one whose content
concerns medical information. Similarly, certain genres of decoys may be more applicable
to specific corporate environments. We have included a detailed discussion of decoy usage
scenarios in Section 4.
In order to design decoys that are as effective as possible, it is also beneficial to analyze
them in a more general sense by considering characteristics that are independent of a par-
ticular context. As initially explored by Bowen et. al in [1], several abstract properties exist
that define how a decoy should operate under ideal circumstances. Some of these attributes
concern the relationship between adversaries and decoy data, while others pertain to the
interactions between legitimate users and deceptive material. A “perfectly believable decoy”
would precisely conform to all of these guidelines, though practical restrictions prevent this
from occurring in most situations. Although there exists some overlap between these traits,
it is also worth noting that they are not completely orthogonal. For example, believability
and differentiability are in contention to some extent.
3.1 Believability
One of a decoy’s primary functions is to be believable. Upon inspection, a decoy should
appear authentic and trustworthy. In the absence of any additional information, it should
be impossible to discern a spurious decoy from authentic data. For example, a decoy tax
document should contain all of the same fields as one that is actually in use, and each of its
fields should be populated with realistic values.
Believability can be formalized via the following thought experiment. Consider a pool of
files, some of which contain real data and some of which are fabricated decoys. Select a decoy
file and real piece of data from this pool, and present it to an adversary. The selected decoy
can be considered perfectly believable if this attacker has an equal probability of selecting
the decoy and the legitimate document.
This characteristic is of critical importance to externally observable features of decoys.
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For example, in the case of decoy documents, it is imperative that these files have realistic
file names and modification dates lest even casual observation reveal their phony nature. In
comparison, the believability of document content is of a lower priority. This is because an
attacker would have already triggered an alert when opening the document by the time this
information came in to play.
3.2 Enticingness
This property takes our idealized decoy material one step further. Decoys should not only
appear valid, but also attract an adversary’s attention. This, of course, will be heavily
influenced by an adversary’s objectives. Some malicious actors will be motivated by financial
gain, and thus would be interested in documents containing monetary information. Others
may seek more specific data such as medical records or a competitor’s secrets.
A document’s level of enticingness can be thought of as the probability that an adversary
would be interested in its exfiltration. A collection of interesting documents is the subset
of documents for which this probability is above a certain threshold. In these terms, it is
desirable that the probability of accessing any fake document which a decoy distribution
system generates is at least equal to the real documents that are in the adversary’s pool of
interest.
3.3 Conspicuousness
Conspicuousness is closely related to enticingness, as both influence the odds of an attacker
accessing a document. Enticingness models how curious an adversary is about a decoy, while
conspicuousness concerns how easy a decoy is to access. A conspicuous document is one that
is easy to find and access. Conspicuousness can be thought of as the amount of effort an
adversary must put in to discovering a decoy, or more formally, the number of actions that
are required to access it.
This characteristic captures the fact that decoy documents should be placed in obvious
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locations such as a user’s desktop. It also demonstrates that it is helpful to place documents
in high traffic file system locations, including working folders where files that are accessed
on a day-to-day basis are stored. File system searches are also user actions that may result
in the presence of decoys. Conspicuous decoys should therefore be easily located by search
queries. This relates conspicuousness back to enticingness, however, as the search terms that
an adversary employees will be heavily dependent on their underlying motivation.
3.4 Detectability
The aforementioned decoy properties all concern the relationship between decoy documents
and a potential attacker. Detectability, on the other hand, describes the ability of decoys
to notify their owner when they have been accessed. An ideal decoy system would issue an
alert each and every time a decoy is accessed, but technical challenges, including network
availability and variability between software platforms, mean that this may not always be
possible in practice.
Deploying multiple overlapping decoy monitors that operate at different system levels
can help mitigate the possibility of an attacker accessing a decoy while remaining unde-
tected. Features of the decoy documents themselves can be leveraged to equip them with
embedded alert code. Monitoring software can be placed in the operating system to detect
predetermined tokens placed within decoys when they are opened. Further, operating sys-
tem auditing can be enabled to record decoy interactions. In order to check for document
exfiltration, software can be placed on network equipment to check for such tokens as well.
Finally, the content of decoy documents can also serve as an alert system. For example,
credentials for spurious accounts can be placed within a decoy. Since there is no reason that
a legitimate user would ever access these accounts, any activity they exhibit would send a
strong signal of malicious intent.
It is particularly critical that decoy access events are detectable while an attack is taking
place. Continuing to monitor this information allows for confidentially violations to be
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handled after adversarial action has been carried out. Decoy material usage should thus
continue to raise alerts after such data has been exfiltrated. Although it may be possible to
evade detection in a particular practical decoy deployment, utilizing an extensive monitoring
network will at the very least increase the time and effort that is required to execute an attack.
This will make exfiltration more difficult and slow down or discourage adversaries as a net
effect.
3.5 Variability
Although a decoy distribution system should strive to make its fake documents seem as
authentic as possible, it would certainly be undesirable if precisely the same well-crafted
decoy file were placed repeatedly throughout a given system or network. This would greatly
simplify the task of distinguishing between legitimate data and the planted decoys that serve
as monitors. In general, there should be as much variability between decoy documents as
there exists in the pool of documents that they are intended to detect. That is, the task of
identifying a decoy should not be reducible to identifying a particular invariant that exists
between all generated decoys.
A different way to conceptualize variability is to consider the task of an adversary who
wishes to extract information from a system while remaining undetected. Assume that
the attacker has been able to discern which documents that have been accessed thus far are
authentic and which are traps. With a collection of “perfectly variable” decoys, this adversary
would still be unable to discern future decoy material from real data with a probability
greater than one half. Previous decoy knowledge, therefore, should not impact the task of
identifying future decoys. Note the relationship that exists between the trait of variability
and the believability characteristic. Variability among decoys essentially means that decoys
should remain believable even after the presence of other decoys has been revealed.
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3.6 Stealth
While it is clearly desirable that every decoy access event be perceptible to the owners of a
system, care must be taken lest the alarms that accomplish this arouse suspicion. An overt
mechanism for issuing alert beacons would provide adversaries with an obvious signal that
an element contains a trap, which completely violates the property of decoy variability. The
messages that are transmitted by decoys must therefore be as subtle and covert as possible.
Raising an alert that decoy content has been accessed necessarily involves taking some
action, however. Even if precautions are taken, there is always the possibility that this act
will be perceptible to a malicious actor. It is therefore also desirable to trigger beacon events
as early as possible to prevent their interception. For example, alerts for file based decoys
should be raised as soon as they are accessed and prior to any content being displayed, if
feasible. This would eliminate the possibility of a decoy being recognized and discarded
before the decoy system has an opportunity to detect that is has been accessed.
3.7 Non-interference
This property is the first to describe how decoys should coexist with legitimate users who
are not masquerading with assumed credentials. An optimal masquerader detection network
would not affect the habits of typical users in any way. By inserting decoy material into an
operating environment, however, we introduce the possibility that this data will confuse users
or otherwise hinder their ability to complete their everyday tasks. It is therefore desirable
for decoys to demonstrate the property of non-interference by not obstructing the behavior
of normal users.
If a file system is populated with decoy documents that serve as intrusion sensors, for
example, the probability that the file system’s primary owner is able to access a particular
standard document should remain the same as it was prior to the introduction of the decoy
content. Similarly, introducing decoy applications to a mobile device’s operating system
should not impact a user’s ability to access real applications as they normally would.
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3.8 Differentiability
In effect, the property of decoy non-interference means that true users must be able to easily
differentiate between spurious decoy content and authentic data. This can be thought of
as the opposite of the believability property. Although decoys should seem as realistic as
possible to adversaries, they should appear to be obviously fake for users who should actually
be accessing a system. A decoy can be considered fully differentiable if a real user will always
succeed at this task.
Balancing the differentiability for authentic users against believability for adversaries is
one of the most critical aspects of any practical decoy deployment system. Though this may
seem quite challenging, in practice, there are many properties that may be utilized to assist
decoy designers in this regard. Legitimate users should be very familiar with detailed aspects
of their data. They will also utilize their system in fairly predictable ways. Masqueraders,
on the other hand, will have a limited knowledge of the files they are trying to exfiltrate.
This gap in knowledge can be leveraged to increase decoy differentiability without affecting
believability in the process.
3.9 Shelf Life
The data that is relevant to a normal user’s tasks gradually changes as new events occur.
The timeliness of data is perhaps even more relevant to attackers, who frequently wish to
abscond with the most recent data that they can possibly access. The freshness of material
that a decoy contains therefore plays a large part in determining how it will be perceived
and how closely it will reflect the aforementioned desirable characteristics.
In order to make decoys appear conspicuous as well as enticing, they can be marked with
a very recent date. This creates a very appealing target by leading adversaries to believe that
the decoy content has been added even more recently than the authentic data that a system
contains. Of course, as time moves on and data is updated while new files are created, these
decoys will lose effectiveness. This can be seen as a shelf life during which decoys maintain
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an optimal level of functionality and after which their efficacy begins to diminish. It is thus
desirable for decoy deployment systems to include a mechanism by which decoys can be
updated, potentially extending their shelf life indefinitely.
4 Decoy Usage Scenarios
This section introduces several broad situations in which security can be bolstered by de-
ploying a decoy defense network. It also attempts to discuss some of the challenges that
must be met in order for decoys to be used effectively in each environment.
4.1 Host Decoys
The most common usage scenario for decoys is to place them on a terminal that is within a
local computer network. This is the operating environment for which decoy documents were
originally designed, and as such they require little modification to be utilized in this manner.
There are still some deployment questions that must be considered, however. For example,
system administrators must determine whether they will push decoy documents out to client
systems or require users to pull decoys from a distribution source themselves. The former
places less of a burden on individual users, but may temporarily lead to an increase in false
positives as users become acquainted with the new decoys that have been placed in their
workspace. Experiments from [13] show how decoy access is affected by a document’s file
system location and the number of deployed decoys.
4.2 Network and Behavioral Decoys
In an effort to detect silent attackers as they eavesdrop on transmissions between computer
systems, we have also developed decoys that operate on a network level. Rather than host
based data files, these decoys consist of bogus data flows that are injected into a network.
This traffic must appear legitimate in terms of protocol specifications but also contains bait
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information, such as a username and password that can be monitored in order to detect
adversarial activity. A study performed in [4] caught an adversary in the act of accessing a
trap account on a web based email service after such credentials were leaked through decoy
network traffic.
Similar techniques can be used to generate fake but believable user activity on end systems
as well. BotSwindler, which is described in [3], is a system designed to accomplish this in
order to detect crimeware. BotSwindler creates realistic user-like actions within a virtual
machine in order to convince malicious applications that they are monitoring a legitimate
system and are therefore learning valuable information, such as credentials that are used
to access other systems. As with network based decoys, accounts corresponding to phony
injected user tokens can be monitored to catch criminals after their crimeware has been
deceived.
The ability to simulate believable user activity of interest to crimeware is pertinent to the
success of BotSwindler. In anticipation of malware that attempts to distinguish simulated
actions from human behavior, the system is designed to be difficult to detect and uses a
formal language that provides a means for generating variable, realistic simulation actions.
A study in [4] asked users to discern generated decoy traffic from authentic information flows;
participants were not able to do so with an accuracy greater than guessing randomly.
4.3 Cloud-Based Decoys
Insider attacks are a major concern in the cloud, since these systems require that trust be
placed in third party cloud administrators. These individuals have access to all information
that their cloud service stores; therefore they can deceitfully, by stealing data, or unintention-
ally, by making configuration errors, threaten the security of sensitive data. Additionally, in
traditional systems, management functionality is usually available only to a few administra-
tors, but in the cloud everyone with access to the infrastructure typically has access to every
resource. Thus, there is an increased risk of malicious employees stealing or manipulating
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sensitive corporate or organizational data. Furthermore, gaining access to an organization’s
infrastructure on the cloud is achieved through providing a username and password. Such
a lightweight authentication mechanism presents an increase in the problem of masquerader
insider threats.
According to [18], observing deviations from typical user behavior can be used in tandem
with decoy documents in a cloud environment. If abnormal data access is noticed, the
cloud can return decoy information that looks legitimate to the attacker who triggered the
unusual usage pattern. In the event of a false positive, an authorized user would be able to
recognize any false information returned by the cloud and then correctly respond to a series
of authentication challenges to prove his or her legitimacy. The cloud would prevent any
unauthorized disclosure of information by continuously returning false data to adversaries.
Also useful in a distributed environment such as the cloud is the concept of computational
decoys. Often a single component of a cloud will be responsible for a certain task. If this
component is compromised, the distributed system allows migration of the uncorrupted
components elsewhere. The compromised components can then actually use computational
deception to return false data, thus diverting an attacker’s attention [11].
4.4 Software Decoys
Companies are constantly faced with the challenge of preventing employees from stealing
proprietary software. In May of 2012, for example, a computer programmer was found
guilty of illegally copying software from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York [2]. Software
is perhaps the most valuable asset for an organization and is consequently a highly profitable
target for insiders. To guard against the unauthorized exfiltration of proprietary software,
we have devised software decoys that look like legitimate source code but have beacons that
trigger when the code is compiled or executed [19].
In addition to the properties of decoys described in Section 3, software decoys should
adhere to several additional requirements. The code must be compilable and executable in
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order to appear believable and authentic. Adversaries should also not be able to distinguish
software decoys from legitimate source code. They must therefore exhibit a similar style to
that of a company’s true source code and not look as if it has been drawn from an outside
source, such as open source software repositories.
4.5 Voicemail Decoys
Typically people who shy away from sending sensitive data via email opt to select voice
as their next method of choice. Yet, there is no guarantee that voicemails are safe from
attackers. Voicemail decoys, messages that sound legitimate to those who are uninformed
but contain false sensitive information, can be used to detect malicious activity. For example,
a voicemail decoy with a human’s voice spelling out authentication credentials to a web site
or credit card information can attract an attacker to steal such information. Usage of the
credentials can then be tracked in order to catch attackers in a similar fashion to that
discussed in Section 3.
4.6 Mobile Decoys
With the increased prevalence of mobile computing, it is becoming crucial to protect cor-
porate use of mobile devices and sensitive data stored on them. In an effort to increase
productivity and instant contact to employees out of the office, companies offer employees
access to company data on mobile devices. In addition, such small and portable machines
are easily lost and stolen. As a result, these devices must be secured against unauthorized
access.
There are two main methods for using decoy technology to serve this purpose. Deceptive
applications can be created that look and feel authentic, but are in fact useless replicas of
a true program. Companies that ban non-corporate software usage on mobile devices can
monitor access to these programs in order to catch employees who violate corporate policy
by installing them.
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A second use of decoys in a mobile setting, which is similar to their usage in a cloud
environment, is for remote access to sensitive documents. People are increasingly using mo-
bile phones to access private information. We are currently working on a mobile application
that interfaces with a user’s documents remotely and detects unauthorized access. When
uploading documents to the remote server, a user creates a authentication gesture that is
later used to retrieve a document’s content. If a user provides an incorrect gesture when
attempting to access a document, illegitimate data is returned.
5 Decoy Generation
Having established what qualities decoys should possess and where they are intended to be
used, we now turn our attention to how they should be created. Users could certainly craft
decoy material by hand. For instance, upon completing an invoice, a user could create a
secondary fake invoice that mirrors the formatting or the authentic version but contains
bogus information. Such decoys would be high quality in terms of their believability because
they would closely mirror real data. They would also be very differentiable; since users would
have created the documents themselves, they would easily be able to recognize their phony
content.
The process of manually introducing decoy content to a system is very tedious, however,
since each time new information is saved on the system an equal amount of spurious material
would need to be created as well. Users would also be responsible for checking access events
for these files. Needless to say, manual decoy creation would scale very poorly to a large
organization with many computers and users.
Making, managing, and monitoring decoys is thus a nontrivial problem. As an alternative
to performing these steps manually, we suggest using a system that does so with minimal
user involvement. This is precisely the purpose of the Decoy Document Distributor (D3)
System [1]. D3 is a tool for generating and monitoring decoys which can be accessed by
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registered users in order to generate decoys for download. It can also be used as a source of
data for decoy use in host and network components.
D3, also known as FOG, is a web site that offers several decoy related services to users
[7]. After creating an account, users can request different types of files that contain material
appealing to malicious actors, such as tax documents and banking statements. D3 will then
automatically craft a document of the type specified by populating a corresponding template
with personal and financial information that is taken from a database of fake identities.
These documents can be downloaded and deployed immediately or reserved for future
use. Furthermore, they will also be equipped with code that serves as an alert “beacon.”
Whenever a D3 decoy document is accessed, this code will issue an alert by establishing a
silent connection with the FOG server. The D3 system can then take appropriate action,
such as logging the alert for future analysis and issuing an alert to the document’s owner via
email.
Alternatively, D3 also provides users with the option to upload their own documents to
be “beaconized” so they will issue alerts when opened. Since these decoy variants contain
actual content, documents that are modified in this way have the advantage of not interfering
with the workflow of legitimate users in any way. The FOG site also allows users to manage
their collection of decoys as well as calculate statistics on decoy usage and access events.
6 Decoy Distribution
Another issue that must be overcome in order to make use of decoys is deployment. In
order to meet this need we have developed the Decoy Distributor Tool (DDT) which can
be used to disseminate decoys throughout a file system with minimal manual involvement.
Our solution does not require any prior knowledge of the organization or content of the file
system in which decoys are to be placed.
Consider the task of a system administrator who wishes to deploy decoy documents
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throughout the computers on his or her network in order to defend them from insider threats.
To manually place decoys in a file system, the system administrator would first have to collect
feedback from users regarding which locations in their file system they would like to place
decoys. After aggregating this data, he or she would then have to request a batch of decoys
and then go through the painstaking process of copying them to their destination directories
one by one.
Such a process does not scale well to an environment with a large number of computers
and users. In contrast, the DDT requires neither knowledge regarding file system specifics
nor individual file placement. It reduces the task of decoy document management to the
simple steps of specifying how many decoys are desired and in which portion of a file system to
place them. Our distribution application is therefore capable of reducing the time required to
establish a system of insider threat sensors by at least an order of magnitude while retaining
all of the security benefits of manual decoy usage.
The DDT has two main objectives. The first is to automatically determine locations in a
computer’s file system that are most likely to be accessed by a malicious insider. The second
is to place decoy documents in these selected locations, either directly along with existing
documents or in a separate folder. The DDT allows a user to select a source directory of
decoy documents that should be distributed on the target machine. The user can choose
an existing folder containing decoys or create a new set by accessing the FOG web site [7]
through the DDT and specifying a number of decoys to be generated. This approach enables
flexibility in the types of documents that are deployed as decoys.
Once the user chooses a source directory of decoy documents, he or she then specifies a
destination directory. This destination directory is used as a root from which target locations
are selected. Enabling the user to specify the root from which target directories are identified
allows more freedom in decoy placement. For example, if a particular owner of a machine
only uses directories within “C:\Sal,” he or she may want to consider placing decoys solely
in directories branching from this root.
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6.1 Creating Decoy Documents
As mentioned in Section 5, Bowen et al. describe properties of effective decoys in [1]. The
DDT tackles conspicuousness and non-interference via the tool’s scheme for selecting loca-
tions to place decoys, while the FOG system deals with detectability by alerting the FOG
account owner when a decoy document is accessed. When creating decoys, the DDT has two
primary considerations for each document, namely the filename of the document and its mod-
ification and creation dates. The DDT’s naming convention and date assignment techniques
attempt to solve the problems of believability, enticingness, variability, non-interference,
and differentiability. Shelf-life is also handled by the DDT’s date assignment method, with
possible future work described in Section 6.4 as an alternative solution.
6.2 Determining locations to place the decoy documents
A study performed in [13] demonstrated that the placement of decoy documents greatly
affects the probability of a user accessing these files. Locations in which decoys are placed in
a file system should be selected so that the decoys remain conspicuous to malicious insiders
but do not impede a legitimate user’s normal actions. The DDT scans the target machine’s
file system starting at the specified root and identifies ten folders with the most recently
accessed documents as well as ten folders containing the greatest number of files with common
document extensions .pdf, .doc, .docx, .ppt, .xls, .txt, .html, and .htm. Selecting the most
populated and most recently accessed folders increases the conspicuousness of decoys, since
these are directories that would be the most probable targets for malicious insiders.
Once the DDT identifies the directories that are in the top ten on the file system for
both recent activity and volume, it then proceeds to populate the remainder of the ten
most crowded directories, followed by any other of the top ten directories which showed the
most activity. In all three cases, decoys are placed evenly among the resultant destination
directory list by iterating through them in descending rank order. Within these destination
folders, one can select the option to deploy the decoy documents directly so that they blend
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in with currently existing documents, or in separate folders that contain decoys only.
6.3 Naming of Decoy Documents and Folders
As with location, the names of documents directly influence how enticing they look to ad-
versaries. Folder names can also impact a user’s decision to access a location in the file
system. When creating new directories in which decoys will be placed, the DDT creates four
enticingly-named new folders in the specified destination directory and evenly disperses the
decoys over these folders.
In an effort to increase the variability of decoys, the DDT uses three methods for naming
decoy documents when attempting to blend them with existing documents in a folder, ran-
domly selecting among these approaches. The prime objective of the naming scheme is to
create filenames that blend in with existing legitimate documents so that they do not look
overtly suspicious. At the same time, the decoy names should lure malevolent users into
opening the documents.
The first naming method selects an existing file in the target directory and appends either
“-final” or “-updated” to the end of the filename. The logic behind this scheme is that the
most recently modified versions of files may seem more official than older versions. Note
that if either of the terms “final” or “updated” are already used in the filename, the DDT
selects another naming method for this decoy.
The second naming method employed by the DDT appends a date string to the end
of a randomly selected existing filename in the target directory. Appending a date string
makes a document appear as if it has been marked as a more authentic, official version. The
DDT uses the format mmddyy for the date strings. For example, a decoy document may be
named company employees-010412.pdf and placed in the target folder alongside a legitimate
document named company employees.pdf.
Blending filenames by use of delimiters is the final naming approach. The DDT calcu-
lates the delimiter used most often in the target directory and modifies a decoy’s filename
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to use this delimiter. For example, if the target directory contains files phone bill 1011.pdf,
shopping list april.doc, tempDirectory.txt, and friends birthdays.docx, the DDT would change
decoy document alice-taxes-33.pdf to alice taxes 33.pdf, since “ ” is the most common de-
limiter in the destination folder. The above directory example demonstrates the importance
of this naming technique. The file tempDirectory.txt clearly stands out as a file that does
not belong; perhaps the file was copied from another machine or automatically generated by
an application. Since this filename doesn’t use the same delimiters as the other filenames in
the same directory, the astute user may assume the file was not created by the regular user
of the computer, who seems to typically name files using the “ ” delimiter.
When inserting decoy documents into a separate folder as described above, the DDT does
not change the filename generated by the FOG system. Since the DDT creates a brand new
folder for the decoy documents, there are no existing documents in this folder and therefore
no need to blend filenames. Placing the decoys documents in a separate directory is therefore
the option that enables the most differentiability of decoys from legitimate documents.
6.4 Modification and Creation Dates of Decoy Documents
Although users do not immediately see file modification and creation dates when first entering
a directory, prudent or suspicious adversaries may check these attributes when carefully
searching for sensitive information. For this reason, it is imperative that the modify and
creation dates blend in with existing documents as well as possible so that they do not
appear statically assigned without regard to their destination directory. Dates can also be
used to increase the allure of certain decoys, such as updated versions of existing documents.
When blending decoy documents into a folder with existing documents, the DDT chooses
a file’s date depending on the naming convention selected. If following a method that appends
either “-final” or “-updated” to a filename, the DDT will set the document’s creation date to
at most 48 hours after the most recently created document in the destination directory. The
document’s last modified date will then be set to up to two days after the resultant creation
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date. If an adversary decided to sort a folder’s contents by date, the decoy documents would
then appear at the top of the sorted list, making them conspicuous and likely to be more
attractive targets.
A naming convention that appends a date string to the decoy’s filename should intuitively
set the file’s creation date to that used in the selected date string. The DDT first determines
an appropriate date for a decoy document by finding the median creation date of existing
files in the decoy’s target directory. The decoy’s creation date is then set within a 48-hour
window of the median. The date string appended to the filename is obtained from the
proposed creation date.
When placing decoy documents in a separate new folder, the DDT has no existing docu-
ment dates on which to base a file’s target date. Therefore, the modify dates of the decoys
are determined by the date that the decoys are generated by the FOG system. A creation
date is then set to up to two days before the existing modify date. The DDT subsequently
alters the modify and creation dates of the new folder in which the decoys are placed. The
creation date of the folder is set to the creation date of the oldest decoy file placed inside;
the modify date is set to that of the most recently modified document. We considered this
dating approach the most practical for the case in which new decoy folders are created, since
users have direct control over the dates applied to the decoy documents. In our future work,
the DDT will include a feature to “refresh” the dates of decoys so that they remain among
the most recent documents in the file system.
7 Conclusions
To summarize, this paper introduced a novel security paradigm which we refer to as decoy
technology. Decoys represent a drastic departure from existing security solutions in several
important ways. By placing content that is spurious yet believable and enticing in the path
of potential adversaries, decoys can serve as a potent last line of defense against attacks
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that traditional security mechanisms fail to adequately defend against. Decoy content can
be proactively seeded throughout a system to defend against potential attacks, or fed to
an adversary once malicious activity has been detected. Furthermore, by tracking decoy
material, violations of confidentiality can be addressed after they have occurred. This is a
capability that alternative security measures are not capable of offering.
Although the deceptive techniques that form the basis of decoys have existed for ages,
they have only recently been leveraged to protect computing resources. This paper discussed
several dimensions along which this process can be refined and extended. It included at-
tributes that all high quality decoys should share as well as contexts in which decoys are
particularly applicable. Furthermore, we shared techniques for efficiently generating decoy
material and disseminating it throughout an organization to create an insider detection net-
work. Decoys can be integrated as useful components of any full featured security solution
and will only increase in prominence as threats against computer systems continue to grow.
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